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1 Introduction  
 
The paper is concerned with ethical trends in the 
accounting profession. There have been an increasing 
number of accounting scandals in recent years  (The 
Economist 2009). The trend is also revealed in the 
very recent global financial crisis, which – while 
possibly involving some unethical business practices 
in the banking and finance industry –  may also reflect 
serious ethical issues in the accounting profession, as 
banks enjoyed the benefits of unqualified opinions 
from their auditors prior to the collapse (Sikka, 2008). 
In contrast to the global trend of increasing 
accounting scandals, the volume of content of the 
New Zealand professional Code of Ethics (COE) has 
grown from six pages to more than 120 pages.  
However, the longer COE does not seem to have had 
a positive impact on accounting ethics.  Most ethical 
codes are built on the moral traditions of their 
respective societies. In this way, Accounting ethics 
reflect and adapt to societal values. The New Zealand 
code, it can be argued, broadly reflects the moral 
inheritance of Europe, which has been refined by 
philosophers like Kant, Bentham and Mill, and 
Spencer (Stackhouse, 2004) . Different ethical 
positions are always contentious but can be useful to 
focus thinking on the role of ethics in Accounting. 
This paper attempts to reveal ethical trends in the 
accounting profession in New Zealand through an 
analysis of the changes in underlying ethical 
philosophies as reflected in the profession’s COE: 
arguably derived from Kantian principles of virtue 
ethics, to a more legalistic and technical rhetoric 
reflective of Utilitarianism and Social Darwinism.  
The accounting profession has over one hundred 
years of history and has been growing in importance 
to business communities and society (Backof & 
Martin, 1991). The New Zealand Society of 
Accountants was founded in 1908 and is now called 
the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants 
(NZICA). The accounting professions in 
commonwealth countries are self-regulating, with 
members’ behaviours being guided by their 
profession’s ethics, regulations, or COE. In New 
Zealand, professional ethics regulations were first 
issued by the Society of Accountants in 1927. The 
most recent version of the COE became effective in 
2003 and was subsequently amended in 2006. This 
paper argues with Abbott (1998) that the changes 
from 1927 to 2006 in the COE reflect a shift from the 
personal qualities of accountants to legitimacy of 
technique. The 2003 COE adopts a more teleological 
approach with emphasis on legitimising the 
accounting profession. Preston et al (1995) observe 
that originally accounting like medicine and law was 
to be regarded as an occupation more heavily 
influenced by the service motive than entirely by the 
profit motive.  As suggested by Higgins & Olson 
(1972), accounting involves judgement and the 
acceptance of responsibility to others.  Putting, 
originally, a focus on character means as Preston et al 
(1995) observe that the profession’s foundations rest 
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on moral schema and code of ethics rather than 
standardisation and regulation.  The paper attempts to 
show how the NZ COE has shifted from a focus on 
character to a more functionalist model which protects 
clients by delivering expert services. While such a 
question cannot be resolved by discussion or by 
empirical surveys, explanations can be offered for 
discussion that may illuminate how ethics codes could 
be derived and developed. 
The plan of the paper is first to consider the 
concept of legitimacy and its link with moral and 
pragmatic philosophies in respect of COE.   Following 
the discussion of legitimacy, the paper considers some 
of the elements of Kantian ethics and consequentialist 
thinking (Utilitarianism, and Social Darwinism) that 
have relevance to the paper. The object is to briefly 
outline the differences between these philosophical 
approaches to ethical problems as is necessary to 
explain moral and pragmatic legitimacy. With these 
differences in mind, the paper next compares the COE 
of 1927 and 2003, being respectively the first and 
latest COE promulgated by the accounting profession 
in New Zealand. The discussion which follows draws 
out concepts embodied in these COE with the overall 
purpose of showing how the focus has moved from 
the character of the accountant to the character of 
accounting.  The process is informed by a shift from a 
more deontological position to a more 
consequentialist position.  We illustrate this latter 
consequentialist position with a case study which has 
had considerable media attention in New Zealand – 
that of Hanover Finance.  Like the Graham case 
(Baskerville-Morley, 2004), the Hanover Finance case 
illustrates the shift in ethics as reflected in practice.  
The accounts, reports and audit of Hanover Finance 
were in a minimalist sense just within the existing 
legal boundaries but there was widespread loss when 
the finance company suddenly collapsed – a not 
uncommon story.  Anecdotal evidence has it that from 
the beginning of the company’s short history that the 
audit engagement was not much sought after because 
of the risk involved.  Before the conclusion, a 
discussion is advanced to draw together three themes: 
values philosophy, COE, and how the shift in values 
reflected in the two COE can be shown in a recent 
company collapse. 
 
2 Legitimacy 
 
The paper sets out, first, to outline the concept of 
legitimacy which, it is argued, underpins many 
professional codes of ethics.  As Aldrich & Fiol 
(1994) observe such a concept may be driven by (1) a 
concept of legitimacy to meet pragmatic assessments 
of stakeholder relations (2) a more normative response 
to what is considered morally appropriate or (3) 
legitimacy grounded on cognitive appropriateness. So 
what is legitimacy? Suchman (1995) defines it as, “a 
generalised perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper and appropriate 
within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs and definitions”(p. 574).The appeal for 
legitimacy is to a social group as a whole 
notwithstanding individual reservations.  It is argued 
in this paper that COE are the means to establish 
social legitimacy and the underlying philosophical 
positions they reflect are designed to be congruent 
with current social values and beliefs.  
What is legitimacy overlaps with what is 
legitimacy for in that legitimacy cements congruence 
between an organisation and its cultural environment. 
The emphasis being not so much what is desirable as 
is recognisable and understandable such that would 
explain and justify an organisation’s existence (Meyer 
& Scott, 1983) (Meyer & Scott, 1983).  Suchman 
(1995) points out that the concept of legitimacy seems 
to divide academic studies into two distinct groups: 
strategic or institutional. The strategic studies 
emphasise a management perspective which 
manipulates and use effective symbols to gain societal 
support (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990; Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975).By contrast, the institutional studies emphasise 
cultural pressures which transcend any organisation’s 
control (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & Rowan, 
1991). 
While the divisions between strategic and 
institutional legitimacy are an important 
consideration, it is the concept of legitimacy being 
driven by pragmatic, moral or cognitive 
considerations that arguably helps to explain why 
COE may be expected to change to meet changing 
social values. 
Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-interested 
calculations of an organisation’s most immediate 
audiences according to Suchman (1995). Aldrich & 
Fiol (1994) point out that for pragmatic reasons 
organisations may emphasis image and support such 
an image by advertising. Moreover, image advertising 
may foster generalised attributions of good 
disposition. Whether such calculations are driven 
strategically or institutionally as a result of cultural 
expectations is not resolved but what is motivating is 
a desire to build and maintain a reputation for 
competence and reliability.  When pragmatic 
strategies of legitimacy are preferred it follows that 
COE will be designed to include consequentialist 
values and beliefs.  
By contrast, moral legitimacy is harder to 
achieve. Ashforth & Gibbs (1990) conclude that for 
organisations their best hope is to accumulate a record 
of technical success. They observe that within the 
contemporary rationalist order, technical performance 
not only establishes consequential legitimacy but it 
also exerts spill-over effects on moral dynamics to 
provide a lasting validation for procedures, and 
structures (Suchman & Eyre, 1992). Moral 
legitimisation comes with a warning from Selznich 
(1949) that it carries with a substantial likelihood of 
unanticipated goal displacement and possibly public 
cynicism. 
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Suchmann (1995) argues that to further cognitive 
legitimacy, gatekeepers may be employed to grant 
certification to label institutions and grant preferred 
definitions such as employed by the professions to 
privilege members and provide them with certified 
recognition. Finally, while pragmatic and moral 
legitimacy can be arrived at by cost-benefit appraisals 
or ethical judgements by way of public discussion 
cognitive legitimacy implies unspoken assumptions as 
to professional legitimacy. Some defensive 
endeavours taken by professional organisations may 
have the wrong effect and imperil taken for granted 
assumptions. On the other hand, pragmatic legitimacy 
relies on audience self-interest that it the right 
organisation for the job, whereas moral and cognitive 
legitimacy do not. 
These observations from the literature explain 
from the point of view of legitimacy, why professions 
need a COE and why such a COE may combine 
element of pragmatic and moral philosophies.  This is 
not to say that any one kind of legitimacy is dominant 
in COE but rather that all three – pragmatic, moral 
and cognitive - are combined.  However, what is 
argued is that there has been a shift within this 
combination.  A shift to reflect changing values not 
necessarily from a strategic design but from 
institutional reflexes to cultural change. The paper 
seeks now to briefly outline features of ethical 
philosophies, which are sources of legitimacy drawn 
on by professional monopolies to underpin their COE. 
 
3 From Kant to Social Darwinism 
 
The principles reflected in the COE have an ethical 
inheritance, which generally reflects the moral values 
and ethical philosophies of the society in which they 
are embedded. This section provides an overview of 
principles of ethical philosophies that are reflected in 
the COE, namely Kantian and Mintz’s virtue ethics, 
Utilitarianism and Social Darwinism. To explain such 
a reflection, the paper attempts to link elements of 
these philosophies with the COE.    The position 
reflected in the paper is that ethics is about choices of 
principles that may right or wrong, while morality is 
about good or bad, though the latter is not under 
discussion. 
Ethics is necessary because people’s actions may 
conflict and most people are more interested in their 
own welfare than in that of others. Such egoistic 
actions are frequently involved in social conflicts. 
Ethics has a twofold purpose: first, to find criteria by 
which to distinguish right and wrong actions; second, 
by means of praise and blame, to promote right 
actions and discourage wrong ones (Russell, 1947, p. 
807). To ameliorate social conflicts, the moral 
inheritance generally shared by Europeans, which is 
also shared in New Zealand, has been developed by 
philosophers like Kant or modified by philosophers 
like Bentham into utilitarianism.  For the purpose of 
this paper, the deontological arguments employed are  
drawn primarily from Immanuel Kant. It is 
acknowledge that there are other major deontological 
contributors, but this paper is necessary limited in its 
content.  
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) argues that a 
fundamental principle of morality is a rational will 
and such rationality of will must be regarded as 
independent and self-governing. He calls these moral 
principles ‘Categorical Imperatives’ (CI) (Kant's 
Moral Philosophy, 2008).  He believes that “The 
highest good was the good will” (Frederick, 1999, p. 
3). Because humans have free will and are rational, 
they are capable of reasoning what constitutes right 
actions. CI are formulated so that rational beings 
should abide by the maxim, “Act only on that maxim 
through which you can [...] will that it should become 
a universal law [for all rational beings] (Kant, 1993, p. 
30)”. In other words, according to Russell, Kant 
maintains an ethical position of “Do as you would be 
done by” (as cited in Russell, 1947, p. 737).  The 
second formulation of CI is to “Act in such a way that 
you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in 
the person of any other, never merely as a means to an 
end, but always at the same time as an end” (Kant, 
1993, p. 36).  Kant argues that certain actions or 
behaviour cannot be justified as moral based on the 
outcomes from such actions. For example, a 
businessman is honest because he knows that it will 
attract more customers and increase profits. He is not 
genuinely moral because his intention to be honest is 
to increase profits under Kantian ethics. Kant’s ethics 
are non-consequentialist. It is a deontological 
approach, which focuses on duties rather than 
consequences.  The third formulation of CI is that, 
“So act as if you were a member of an ideal kingdom 
of ends in which you were both subject and sovereign 
at the same time” (Frederick, 1999, p. 4). This means 
that people should abide by the maxim all of the time, 
without exception. The maxim is thus a law which 
applies to everyone. No one should exempt himself 
from the maxim but expect others to abide by it.  In 
other words, Kant’s deontological approach 
emphasised a sense of duty. 
However, this focus on duty is not the same as a 
focus on character, except that, as Aristotle observes, 
“We are what we repeatedly do” (Gough, 1998).  In 
this vein, according to virtue ethics theory, virtues 
characterise the decision maker: “Possession and 
exercise of virtues tend to increase the decision 
maker’s propensity to exercise sound ethical 
judgements” (Armstrong, Ketz, & Owsen, 2003, p. 3). 
This combines Kant’s view of rational cognitive acts, 
recognising moral issues and thinking them through, 
with an intention to act morally, and the ethical 
character to bring that intention to fruition (Armstrong 
et al, 2003).  From Kant comes the element of reason 
necessary to understand issues, think, and arrive at an 
ethical judgement, while virtues add ethical 
motivation, allowing individuals to place the interest 
of others before themselves. For Pincoff (1986), 
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virtues are those attributes of character that describe 
an individual’s direct concern for others, which 
contrasts with Adam Smith’s view that people act in 
their own self-interest, egoism, and that they are 
rational but greedy.  Mintz (1995) believes that virtues 
in accounting are linked to the requirements of 
accounting professional codes: trustworthiness, 
benevolence, altruism, honesty, integrity, impartiality, 
open-mindedness, reliability, dependability and 
faithfulness. Thus, what are for Kant elements of an 
over-riding concept of “duty”, become virtues in 
practice and characteristics of accountants. 
In contrast to Kant’s deontological perspective, 
Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) developed 
utilitarianism. In essence, his teleological approach 
advocates identifying the aggregate of pleasure and 
pain that would best advance “the greatest happiness” 
of all of those whose interest is in question. Bentham 
holds not only that the good is happiness in general 
but also that each individual always pursues what he 
believes to be in his own happiness.  He rejects Kant’s 
subjectivism of what ought to be for everyone else as 
merely an expression of Kant’s moral feelings. 
“If each man in fact and inevitably pursues his 
own pleasure, there is no point saying he ought to do 
something else.  Kant urged that “you ought” implies 
“you can”; conversely if you cannot, it is futile to say 
you ought” (Russell, 1947, p. 806).   
Bentham seeks a more scientific approach in 
terms of utility and consequences and by such terms 
arrives at a deterministic account of mental 
occurrences (Pope, 2004). Utilitarianism introduces 
the idea that whether an action is ethical is based on 
the outcomes resulting from that action. Using the 
same example as above, the businessman is honest 
because he knows that is the way to increase profits. 
Because the consequence is to increase profits and 
acting honestly is a way to achieve this consequence, 
the businessman is considered to be morally right.  In 
contrast to Kantian ethics, the intention of being 
honest is irrelevant as long as it achieves the ends.  
Mill (1861) declares: “Utility, or the Greatest 
Happiness Principle holds that actions are right in 
proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong 
as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness ” (p. 
257). If the outcomes of action or behaviour lead to 
greatest happiness, which is calculated as the sum of 
the happiness of all affected people in a given 
situation, that action or behaviour is ethical. This 
rejects Kant’s ethics where the ethical values of 
people are absolute and autonomous. Under 
utilitarianism, consequences can justify the means. 
For example, according to utilitarian ethics, stealing 
can be justified if more people benefit from this action 
than suffer losses. So where a person steals from his 
wealthy neighbour’s household of four people and 
gives the proceeds to an orphanage with fifteen 
orphans, the stealing is an ethically permissible action 
because the happiness of the fifteen orphans is greater 
than the happiness of the neighbour’s household.  
One of the drawbacks of utilitarianism is the 
difficulty of quantifying happiness and a calculation 
of happiness (Preuss, 1998). Other flaws also exist. 
The concept of utilitarianism relies on legislators, who 
prescribe sanctions, knowing what is in the 
community’s interests while ignoring their own 
interests or desire for pleasure. If, however, as Adam 
Smith argues, every man always pursues his own 
pleasure, how are we to ensure that the legislator will 
pursue the pleasure of mankind in general? (Russell, 
1947) Thus, the ideal that all pain and happiness can 
be brought into calculation is, for some, flawed. For 
example,  those framing accounting standards must 
ignore the interests of lobby groups or their own 
paymasters to pursue a community’s interest, which 
presupposes that they know what such interests are 
and they know which side of a social conflict they 
support (Tinker, 1991).   
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903), a liberal 
utilitarian, first enunciated the concepts of Social 
Darwinism, drawn from the theory of natural selection 
known as Lamarckism, in which acquired 
characteristics are inherited. In nature, living things 
can modify new traits gradually in response to needs 
created by their environments and pass them on to 
their offspring (Stent, Sydney, & Jeffrey, 2001). 
Spencer applies this argument, with irresistible 
evolutionary logic, that it is natural and proper for the 
strong to survive at the expense of the weak (Spencer, 
1897): 
…every type that is best adapted to its 
conditions, which on the average means every higher 
type, has a rate of multiplication that insures a 
tendency to predominate. Survival of the fittest, acting 
alone, is ever replacing inferior species by superior 
species. (Spencer, 1882, 2:478 cited in Weikart, 2009, 
p. 24) 
This paper adopts Mike Hawkins definition of 
Social Darwinism as “the attempt to justify or 
promote human competition for scarce resources as a 
necessary, natural phenomenon fostering biological 
progress” (Weikart, 2009, p. 21). It has two central 
assumptions. First, it suggests that there are 
underlying and irresistible forces acting in societies, 
which are like natural forces that operate in the animal 
and plant kingdoms. Second, these social forces are of 
a kind to produce evolutionary progress through 
natural conflict between social groups. The best 
adapted and most successful groups survive these 
conflicts (Abercrombie, Hill, & Turner, 1994). 
Indeed, to support those unfit to survive can be argued 
to be morally incorrect, but that does not mean that 
the opportunity for self-improvement should be 
denied (Hawkins, 1997). For example, the American 
capitalist, Andrew Carnegie, was an overt Social 
Darwinist, using his vast fortune to establish libraries 
and other educational institutions so that the so-called 
weak might have the opportunity for self-
improvement (Hawkins, 1997). Social Darwinism 
introduces a laissez-faire approach to business 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 4, Summer 2015, Continued – 5 
 
552 
(Weikart, 2009).  “The business of business is 
business” is a quote attributed to Milton Friedman, an 
advocate of laissez-faire economics.  Taking this 
observation as the hallmark of Social Darwinism, the 
relevance of this philosophy to the latest COE is 
found in the espoused qualities of competence and 
technical efficiency. More broadly, Social Darwinism 
mainly holds that it is good to be successful and that 
eliminating weaker competition facilitates 
evolutionary progress. It justifies ruthless competition 
and argues that it is both natural and proper to exploit 
the weak (Bergman, 2001).  Echoes of Social 
Darwinism arguably resound whenever the concept of 
“the business of business is business” is used to reject 
suggestions of business social responsibility and may 
be applied to audit firms who justify disclaimers to 
third parties on the grounds that they owe only a duty 
of care to those who pay them. 
Neimark (1995) observes that, “What constitutes 
ethical behaviour at any time is socially constructed; it 
is a product of time and place” (p. 94).   Such 
behaviour may be constructed from concepts of 
legitimacy, whether pragmatic, moral or cognitive 
according to current values.  To explain the 
dominance of Social Darwinism today, Neimark 
(1995)  argues that social, economic and political 
structures, collectively and inevitably, produce 
patterns of behaviour that are not ethical even by 
contemporary Western standards:   
“We must consider the relationship between 
what individuals do and the institutional structures 
and the ideological underpinnings of capitalism, 
including its emphasis on Social Darwinism, 
individualism, competition, and material 
acquisitiveness” (p. 93). 
Some blending of these opposing philosophical 
positions (Kant, Utilitarianism and Social Darwinism) 
is the basis and justification for most modern business 
interpretations of ethics and for various professional 
COE (Stackhouse, 2004).  In the next section, the 
paper shows how these three philosophical positions 
are reflected in the accounting professions COE in 
New Zealand. Through the analysis, the paper 
demonstrates the inclination and the trend of 
prevailing philosophies reflected in COE. To achieve 
this, the paper compares the New Zealand accounting 
profession’s first COE in NZ, issued in 1927, with the 
current one, issued in 2003.  
 
4 New Zealand's Code of Ethics (COE) 
 
This section identifies differences in the content of the 
1927 and the 2003 COE. By analysing these changes, 
this section attempts to demonstrate the shift that has 
occurred in their underlying ethical philosophies.  
The New Zealand Society of Accountants 
adopted its first Professional Ethics code in 1927. This 
consists of 17 clauses and is six pages in length 
(attached as Appendices A). The 17 clauses cover a 
range of requirements, including: the overall 
characteristics of professional accountants (clause 1-
2), confidentiality (clause 3), disclosure of conflict of 
interests (clause 4), relationship with other 
accountants and the profession (clause 5-9), 
advertising (clause 10), obligation to stakeholders 
(clause 11), unbiased judgement (clause 12), no 
commission dealing (clause 13), obligations to the 
profession and the Society (clause 14-17).  As Preston 
et al(1995) found in the 1917 American Association 
of Public Accountants code of ethics there were 
similar prohibitions against encroachment and 
advertising.  According to Preston et al (1995) the 
term independence was not used until 1964, rather the 
emphasis is “replete with exhortations of duty, 
responsibility and loyalty” (p. 513).  They argue such 
ethics reflect contemporary conceptualisations of 
morality and societal culture to legitimise the 
profession within a wider public domain. The 
insistence is on good character.  Preston at al (1995) 
suggest that the focus was on forming oneself as an 
ethical subject and being of good character was the 
basis for legitimising the activities on accountants.  
This focus on duty, responsibility and loyalty ties in 
with the concepts virtue ethics.   
The first paragraph of the 1927 Professional 
Ethics, which has disappeared from the current COE, 
reads:  
Every member of the Society in the practice of 
his profession or in the course of his service to his 
employer should give such service with absolute 
fidelity and should be actuated by a spirit of fairness 
to client and employer, considerate to the fellow 
practitioners, loyalty to his country, and devotion to 
high ideals of courtesy and honour (p.1). 
The stated virtues of professional members 
include “absolute fidelity”, “a spirit of fairness”, being 
“considerate to the fellow practitioners”, “loyalty to 
his country”, and “high ideals of courtesy and 
honour”.  These virtues are also reflected in 
subsequent clauses. For example, clause 5 stipulates 
that practitioners “should not use unfair means to win 
professional advancement or to injure the chances of 
another Public accountant to secure and hold 
employment”, reinforcing the concept of fairness in 
dealing with other people.  
Furthermore, clause 10 requires that practitioners 
should only advertise their services by means of a 
“card”, the size of which should be small in a 
newspaper or directory and whose content should 
include only the name, title and address of the 
advertiser.  Such advertising is very humble, 
suggesting that, at the time, the Society discouraged 
advertising of its professional members in order to 
avoid competition between them. It may reflect also 
professionals’ consideration and courtesy for their 
fellow practitioners and a collective  distaste for 
image creation. Competition among practitioners may 
result in competing fees and it may be regarded as 
being not honourable to compete with each other for 
fees. This requirement has disappeared from the 2003 
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code, which is silent with regard to intra-professional 
competition. Indeed, for pragmatic reasons of 
legitimacy as Aldrich & Fiol (1994) observe image 
advertising may foster generalised attributions of 
good disposition. 
In addition, Clause 11 specifies that practitioners 
have responsibilities towards “prospective investors, 
creditors, or others” during the course of preparing or 
certifying statements. The responsibilities owed to 
prospective investors or other third parties in 1927 
code were explicit. The 2003 code remains silent 
about duties towards ‘prospective investors’.  The 
requirements prescribed in the 1927 COE focus on 
personal characteristics or the good will of rational 
beings. It reflects both a Kantian “duty”-based ethical 
approach, which believes that rational beings have a 
duty to act with good will, and a virtue ethics view of 
the codes as found in Mintz (1995). Values such as 
fidelity, consideration, loyalty, courtesy and honour 
are often used to characterise a good person. They 
assume a sense of self moral regulations governing 
how accountants should act. The 1927 code focuses 
on duty and, by repetitive practice, such duties 
become virtues, which in turn become the 
characteristics of accountants. Such virtues imply a 
deontological ethical philosophy underlying the 1927 
code, which focus on virtue as forming character 
(Mintz, 1995). 
The current COE comprises two parts, the first 
part being 63 pages long, and the second part, 
Independence in Assurance Engagements, being 60 
pages long.  It reveals a discourse as Previts & Merino 
(1979) found of increasing use of legalistic and 
technical rhetoric and a growing concern with public 
relations. The COE contains five fundamental 
principles, including Integrity, Objectivity and 
Independence, Competence, Quality Performance and 
Professional Behaviour. Each principle is broken 
down into detailed rules, with applications provided to 
illustrate how the rules apply in different situations. 
According to NZICA’s official website, the current 
COE comprises “fundamental principles and provide 
guidance on professional conduct needed to sustain 
public confidence in the profession” (NZICA, n.d.). 
This implies that accountants need to behave 
professionally in order to sustain public confidence 
and that sustained public confidence is an outcome of 
acting professionally. Therefore, the current COE 
promotes behavioural rules or regulations that instruct 
professionals how to behave with the aim of 
maintaining public confidence. The emphasis is that 
accountants should behave in such a way as to deliver 
the desired outcome. Their conduct is justified by the 
outcomes they lead to, implying an underlying 
consequentialist ethics philosophy.  
There are two fundamental principles introduced 
into the current COE to regulate how accountants 
should do their job to ensure that they provide quality 
service. These are competence and quality 
performance:   
Competence - Members must only undertake 
professional work in which they have the Competence 
necessary to perform the work to the technical and 
professional standards expected. (p 3) 
Quality Performance - Members must perform 
their professional work with due care and diligence, 
ensuring that all professional obligations are 
completed in a timely manner and are carried out in 
accordance with the relevant technical and 
professional standards appropriate to that work. (p 3) 
These two principles, not in the original code, 
mainly deal with technical competence and good 
quality work. Competence and Quality Performance 
are required to assure the public that accounting 
professionals are technically competent to deliver 
their service. This is similar to a quality control 
procedure in a manufacturing factory for ensuring the 
quality of products so that they can be competitive in 
the marketplace. It can be argued that this similarity 
suggests that the two principles are not so relevant to 
ethics, but are more like a quality control procedure. 
Some authors share this view. Velayutham (2003) 
analysed both New Zealand and Australian COE and 
argues that “the main focus of the codes … is quality 
rather than ethics” (p. 484). Further, he states that 
“Compliance with technical standards and 
professional behaviour could not be considered to be 
ethical principles since their compliance depends on 
law like statements and quality standards” (p. 494). In 
relation to competence, Fogarty (1995) adds, “The 
central message of quality … fails to express any 
coherent moral ideas” (p. 111). On the other hand, it 
may be argued that quality does have an ethical 
dimension especially when clients are unaware of 
what constitutes a quality standard.  According to 
Dellaportas (2005) the social contract concept and 
clients’ reliance on the knowledge of the professional 
accountant professional competence should be 
perceived to be a duty of the professional accountant. 
The addition of these two principles to the 
current COE implies that quality work is at least 
equally as important as accountants’ character, if not 
even more so. Velayutham (2003) also comments on 
the quality focus of the current COE and maintains 
that it reflects a shift from the ideals of sentient beings 
to standards of service, where “technique has 
character as an important value” (p. 501). This may 
reflect a Social Darwinian approach in that the 
accounting profession seeks competent people who 
can deliver quality work. People who are not 
technically competent enough should not be in the 
profession. The accounting profession needs such 
technically-competent people to maintain its public 
profile, and possibly improve its reputation and 
image, so that the whole profession becomes stronger 
and more influential in the business community and 
society. 
Apart from the two new quality focused 
principles, other principles also reflect their utilitarian 
origin. For example, the purpose of the Integrity 
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principle is that “It is members’ adherence to the 
fundamental principle of Integrity that allows the 
public to derive their trust in the accountancy 
profession” (p.7). Although integrity can be seen as a 
virtue, in here, there is an aim to being honest. 
Integrity is required to gain trust from the public. 
Therefore integrity is a means to reach an outcome,  
Some authors argue that the primary purpose of 
a COE is to improve the image of the profession and 
there is for pragmatic reasons of legitimacy good 
reason to promote such an image (Backof & Martin, 
1991; Fogarty, 1995). According to Kantian ethics, 
this is not morally right because the purpose of having 
integrity or providing quality service is not to improve 
a profession’s image; rather, the motive is on 
goodness as an absolute moral principle. By contrast, 
according to utilitarianism, integrity and quality 
service are needed to earn a good public image for the 
profession. Accounting professionals’ characteristics 
are less relevant if they do not result in improving the 
public’s image of the profession. The focus of 
competence and quality performance are arguably 
primarily technical issues aimed at legitimising the 
profession’s monopoly particularly in assurance 
engagements (Mitchell, Puxty, Sikka, & Willmott, 
1994). 
Furthermore, the principles of Independence and 
Objectivity outlined in Rules 3 &4 in the current COE 
are to ensure that professional accountants are 
objective when making professional judgements 
particularly for assurance engagements. However, 
Williams (1992) points out that independence in 
accounting has shifted from being conceived as an 
integral part of character to being regarded as an 
economic commodity.  The consequence of this shift 
is that independence is now the focus of much 
interpretation as a claim to independence is not longer 
credible to the general public.  Claims to 
independence need today to be supported by rules 
specifying its nature and scope (Preston, et al., 1995).  
Such rules of independence are expressed in rules that 
are seen to be more precise and legally interpretable 
so that compliance or non-compliance can be 
determined. The importance of codifying ethics into 
rules is, as Preston et al (1995) point out; a big part of 
legitimation. While rules may be a source of 
legitimation in contemporary society, this increasing 
emphasis as Preston et al (1995) observe, “raises the 
question as to whether the code and the discourses 
surrounding it may be defined as moral” (p. 528).  
Rules require only conformity and no moral 
discernment. As Francis (1991) comments that the 
moral question as to how I, an accountant, should act 
in a particular situation becomes a legalistic rather 
than a moral one. 
Some writers question the motive of this 
principle. For example, Mitchell et al. (1994) examine 
audit failures and alleged unprofessional conduct by 
accounting firms and their partners in UK. They find 
that professional accounting bodies failed to take 
effective action against offending firms or their 
partners. Therefore they argue that “The ideals of 
independence and integrity, [...] are little more than a 
smokescreen, or fig-leaf, for the pursuit and protection 
of sectional interests” (p. 48). Allen (1997) also states:  
Independence is not a value in and of itself. 
Independence in this context is an instrumental value. 
We value it because we think it helps produce 
something else: efficiency (of the capital markets and 
thus, efficiency of the economy as a whole(p. 3).  
According to Preuss (1998),utilitarianism offers 
an advantage to accountants in that it links self-
interest with moral behaviour and is by definition self-
serving (i.e. he argues that utilitarianism is formulated 
on a deterministic psychology that every individual 
seeks his own happiness). It is, he argues, by default 
the most influential ethical theory in the business 
context. The calculation of greatest happiness and 
harm shares similarities with the calculation of profit 
and loss.  
Accountants can be seen as conveying neutral 
information on which users can base their decisions 
and, in this sense, the consequences can only be 
helpful. However, in as much as the COE focus on the 
consequences of an ethical action, it would seem that 
the COE conveys legitimacy to both professional 
monopoly and the wider public.  
The importance of these principles is reflected in 
the introduction section of the current COE 
The Code of Ethics recognises that the objectives 
of the accountancy profession are to work to the 
highest standards of professionalism, to attain the 
highest levels of performance and generally to meet 
the public interest requirement. This Code is designed 
to provide members with authoritative guidance on 
minimum acceptable standards of professional 
conduct. The Code focuses on essential matters of 
principle and is not to be taken as a definitive 
statement on all matters. 
Perhaps the exposure draft (ED) of the latest 
COE spells out the importance of fundamental 
principles more clearly. (An ED was issued by 
Professional Standard Board in December 2010 and 
the new COE became effective on the 1 January 
2012). According to section 100.1 of the ED  
“A distinguishing mark of the accountancy 
profession is its acceptance of the responsibility to act 
in the public interest. Therefore, a member’s 
responsibility is not exclusively to satisfy the needs of 
an individual client or employer. In acting in the 
public interest, a member shall observe and comply 
with this Code”.   
Again, the COE emphasises that to adhere to the 
principles is to sustain a public interest. Public interest 
is what sets members of the profession apart as a 
group of “ethical and competent accountants” 
compared to accountants who are outside the 
profession. The paradox is that the professional 
qualified accountants are trying to limit their 
responsibility to the public by introducing something 
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like the Bannerman clause.  Such clauses undermine 
the concept of public interest and, as a consequence, 
the COE looks more like a screen  to legitimate the 
profession The self-interest of the Bannerman type 
clauses  imply a social Darwinist influence.  As other 
have observed for some time the profession needs to 
have a COE to promote their own interests, secure 
privileges and stay competitive (Johnson, 1972; 
Larson, 1977; Preston, et al., 1995; Willmott, 1986). 
Overall, the differences between the 1927 and the 
current COE and the 1927 codes illustrate a shift in 
the ethics philosophies underlying them. The 1927 
code implies a deontological approach, whereas the 
2003 Code reflects a teleological approach. Some of 
this shift may be explained by the confusion that the 
“new burst of interest in business ethics in 
universities” has evoked (Stackhouse, 2004, p. 238). 
He goes on to write: 
Textbooks written for these [ethical] courses 
seldom treat theological issues, focusing instead on 
some combination of Kantian principles, utilitarian 
calculus and various versions of social Darwinism.(p. 
238) 
An explicit example of a shift in the COE to 
limit the obligations to stakeholders is evidenced by 
Baskerville-Morley (2004).  She refers to the Graham 
case which led to statutory reform of the accounting 
profession in New Zealand.  For some time prior to 
1991, the Chartered Accountants Society in New 
Zealand had maintained a Fidelity Fund to 
recompense clients who had been cheated by their 
‘black sheep’ members.  It was a characteristic of 
being a ‘Chartered Accountant’ which, by having the 
fund, combined a sense of duty and virtue as 
hallmarks of a profession. That is, the profession, 
recognising that it must inevitably at some time have 
“bad” members, set out to protect unknown third 
parties from the effects of these members’ activities.  
However, as Baskerville-Morley (2004) points out, 
following the Graham case, which emptied the 
Fidelity Fund , the then ‘Big 6’ accounting firms in 
New Zealand in conjunction with other practitioners 
no longer wanted to maintain the fund and lobbied 
successfully for its cessation.  Since then, injured third 
parties have no resort to the profession for 
recompense. The outcome is consistent with Sikka’s 
(2000) determination from the UK that power 
symmetries meant that private profit, not human 
welfare, was the dominant behavioural driver.  The 
push to abolish the Fidelity Fund concealed a power 
asymmetry between the influence of the Big 6 firms 
and that of other members of the profession in small 
and medium partnerships (Baskerville-Morley, 2004).  
The following section draws on another New 
Zealand case, that of the failure surrounding Hanover 
Finance, which shares similar features to the 
Baskerville-Morley’s (2004) Graham case in that it 
attracted high public attention because the majority, 
least dominant, stakeholders were marginalised.  Like 
the Graham case, the Hanover Finance case illustrates 
how the shift in the COE is reflected in practice.   
 
5 Pragmatic legitimacy: the Hanover 
Finance case 
 
As described above legitimacy comprises a 
combination of moral, cognitive and pragmatic 
elements. Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the self-
interested calculations of an organisation’s most 
immediate audiences according to Suchman (1995).  
The case illustrated reflects a shift towards pragmatic 
legitimacy and rather less of moral (what is morally 
appropriate) or cognitive (what is grounded on 
cognitive appropriateness) legitimacy.  In this case, 
the audit firm’s most immediate audience was the 
small group of major shareholders controlling 
Hanover. 
In December 2009, it was announced that 16,000 
so-called “Mum and Dad” depositors in the failed 
finance company, Hanover Finance, had voted to take 
shares in Allied Finance, another New Zealand 
finance company, in order to seek future repayment 
(Eriksen, 2008). The “Mum and Dad” investors had, 
in reality, lost most of their money as the new shares 
that they had to accept in place of the deposits with 
Hanover Finance are of little and diminishing value. It 
is a story of social conflict, where accounting served 
the interests of one side of this conflict, that of the 
controlling shareholders - accounting taking the form 
of one of the Big 4 firms.  The Big 4 firms enjoy 
considerable market place legitimacy resting on their 
recognisability (cognitive legitimacy) and good 
reputation for efficient audits (moral legitimacy).  It is 
the third element in the legitimacy combination, the 
pragmatic that features as dominant in this story. 
The case attracted huge media attention in New 
Zealand.  Television cameras camped outside the 
homes of the controlling shareholders who, to avoid 
further interviews, fled the country.  The media 
sensed corruption and fraud but, in fact, as the 
auditors were probably aware, the company’s 
financial reports were within the “form” of the law 
(such as existed) if not its substance.  The Hanover 
Finance story begins in 2006.  Thousands of 
depositors were drawn to Hanover Finance by 
television advertising fronted by a popular television 
news reader, Richard Long, who gave authenticity to 
what would subsequently be shown to be extravagant 
claims: 
The Long advertising strategy was highly 
successful and at the end of the June 2006 year the 
company had total assets of more than $1 billion and 
was ranked number one in terms of total assets and 
net profit after tax in the KPMG Property 
Development and Commercial Finance category. 
(Gaynor, 2008) 
What was not disclosed in the advertising and 
prospectus was that nearly 20% of the company’s 
assets were related-party loans with a capitalised 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 12, Issue 4, Summer 2015, Continued – 5 
 
556 
interest facility relating to property bought by the 
controlling shareholders that was worth much less 
than their book value.  Amazingly, under accrual 
rules, the interest due but not received from the 
related-party loans were treated as income and the 
audits were not qualified.  What is of significance is 
that as the years progressed increasingly more of 
Hanover Finance’s  loans became related-party loans 
and 93% of these loans were on a capitalised interest 
basis, with only 7% paying interest. Moreover, a 
capitalised loan is where interest is added to the 
principal instead of being paid, so that interest is 
deferred. Nevertheless, “Hanover included this 
interest as interest received and, as a result, was able 
to give the impression that its earnings were far 
stronger than they actually were from a cash income 
point of view” (Gaynor, 2008). Such an accounting 
policy, while not strictly illegal, is misleading and 
says much about the how the auditors viewed these 
transactions.  To accept the form rather than the 
substance of these transactions implies that drivers of 
moral and cognitive legitimacy were weakly held. If, 
as Suchmann (1995) observes, “Pragmatic legitimacy 
rests on the self-interested calculations”, then the 
driver in this sad story seems to be self-interest. 
The accounting misdemeanours were several. In 
New Zealand directors are supposed to declare 
dividends only after confirming that the business is a 
going concern. The six major shareholders of Hanover 
Finance distributed 5.5 million dividends to 
themselves after its profits plunged and shortly before 
interest payments were suspended. As one business 
commentator observes, this action was hardly 
justifiable (Gaynor, 2008).  
Whether the auditors questioned the solvency 
declaration is unknown.  It may be argued that had the 
auditors respected the Bannerman judgment of 
responsibility to unknown third parties then they may 
have been prompted to ask further questions.  But 
they chose not to this and the Big 4 firms are now 
adopting a specific “Bannermann” clause to their 
audits denying responsibility to anyone except the 
shareholders as a body.  Quite what “as a body” 
means no one knows. 
Inter-company loans can obscure the state of a 
holding company's true financial situation. Without 
consolidated accounts, investors cannot be assured 
that so-called “stringing” or "hydraulicking”is not 
taking place. Stringing or hydraulicking is commercial 
slang used to describe the way a finance company 
might use one loan book as equity to raise another. 
The result is a complex structure that is more highly 
leveraged than is possible to see from the available 
information. When asked about the inter-company 
loans, Mr Hotchin, one of Hanover Finance’s 
controlling shareholders, pointed to each finance 
company's trust deed as well as the signoff from the 
Big 4 auditors as reasons why investors should be 
reassured (Cone, 2004). In other words, the image of 
legitimacy created by the Big 4 firms was enough to 
silence critics. 
Since the controlling shareholders of Hanover 
Finance always acted to just within such laws as exist 
to control finance company operations, their auditors 
also were always able to endorse their transactions. As 
Tinker (1991) observes, accounting inevitably favours 
one side of a social conflict. In spite of a new COE in 
2003, the practices that ruined the New Zealand share 
market in the late 1980s were repeated: extravagant 
advertising to draw investors, unwarranted dividend 
payments from capital, lack of consolidation so as to 
hide illiquid subsidiaries, and inter-company loans to 
related parties.   
The central point with regard to this case and its 
relevance to the paper is that the auditors – post-
Bannerman – chose to issue unqualified audit reports 
which served the interests of a small group of 
Hanover Finance shareholders.  The case is now under 
investigation.  Chartered accountants are given a 
monopoly over audit work because they enjoy 
legitimacy.  Cognitively, they are recognised as the 
appropriate professional body and their advertising is 
cultivated to covey an image of responsibility and 
integrity.  Morally and cognitively, they enjoy 
legitimacy because of their professional image. Yet, 
the auditors in the Hanover Finance case sought to 
serve specific interests. This shift from ‘means’ to 
‘ends’ is a shift exemplified in terms of the driving 
features of legitimacy. 
 
6 Discussion 
 
Ethical problems in accounting and auditing are 
global. Sikka (2010) refers to the Lehman insolvency 
and warns that the public should be sceptical of the 
audited reports published by large corporations. Sikka 
(2010) comments: 
Ernst & Young, Lehman's auditors, collected 
$31mn in fees in 2007, and knew of Lehman's $ 50 bn 
Repo 105 accounting gimmick, but did not make or 
demand public disclosures even though the insolvency 
examiner argues (page 735) that "the only purpose or 
motive for the transactions was reduction in balance 
sheet … there was no substance to the transactions". 
Repo 105 had been in existence since 2001. Perhaps, 
the auditing firm was unwilling to upset its 
paymasters. (p. 1) 
It is this question of accountants and auditors 
accepting the “form” of transactions rather than 
enquiring too deeply into their “substance” that is a 
troubling problem, as illustrated in the Hanover 
Finance case cited above. Reducing the balance sheet 
by off-balance sheet techniques may not be 
uncommon but most auditors would or should be 
aware of such practices. As Sikka (2010) states, 
Some estimates have suggested that banks may 
have organised as much as $ 5,000 bn off their 
balance sheets and window-dressed their leverage. 
Despite the chicanery, all distressed banks received 
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clean bills of health from their auditors. If auditors 
are unwilling to speak up on accounting gimmicks of 
$ 50 bn or $ 5,000 bn, there is no point is continuing 
with the present arrangements. (“Lehman chicanery 
is tip of the iceberg” The Guardian, 16 March 2010) 
What this paper tries to show is that the practices 
referred to by Sikka (2010) and illustrated in the 
Hanover Finance case occur because of the economic 
practice of what Shearer (2002) refers to as “granting 
value to a desired object only insofar as the object 
stands in instrumental relation to the desiring subject 
(p. 553) Shearer explains further, “In the language of 
Kant, the other is made a means rather than an end in 
herself, and by this act is objectified and her own 
subjectivity denied” (p. 553).  The unfortunate 
Hanover Finance investors were of no consequence to 
the auditors and as “others” were only a “means” 
whereby audit fees were collected.  In other words, 
calculation of self interest prevailed and served a 
legitimising strategy. 
The practice of accounting is driven by the 
assumptions of neo-classical economics: “the subject 
will do that and only that for which he expects a net 
gain in well-being”(Arrow, 1979, pp. 111-112). This 
deep rooting of accounting within neo-classical 
economic theory has been observed by many (Cooper 
& Sherer, 1984; Gray, 1992; Hines, 1989; Lukka, 
1990; Mouck, 1995; Preston, et al., 1995; Reiter, 
1994; Thompson, 1998; Tinker, 1991; Tinker, 
Lehman, & Neimark, 1991; Tinker, Merino, & 
Neimark, 1982) .  The problem with neo-classical 
assumptions is that, as Shearer (2002) observes,  
If economic theory does not effectively restrict 
itself to discrete domains of human life, then it is at 
risk of colonizing the whole of human experience, 
ensuring that human subject understand themselves 
and one another as self-interested utility maximizers, 
even in those domains of human engagement most 
removed from market transactions. (p. 549)  
In other words, neo-classical economic theory 
practices an imperialism that spreads to the whole of 
human experience.  But where do these assumptions 
draw their strength? Stigler (1981) comments, “We 
believe that man is a utility-maximising animal …, 
and to date we have not found it informative to carve 
out a section of his life in which he invokes a different 
goal of behaviour” (p.176).  The result as Shearer 
(2002) explains is that, “Within economic discourse 
each individual is properly held accountable only for 
the pursuit of her or his private good” (p. 556).  As 
utility-maximising animals our origins and 
motivations can be explained by Social Darwinism.  
But this was not always the case.  Before Spencer, 
there was Kant where, perhaps, more in theory than 
practice, society thought honour was paramount and 
that the means justified the ends.  However, as the 
COE separated by time witness, other ideas prevail: 
“self-interest (broadly construed) becomes the only 
motive that appears rational for a sovereign and self-
determining subject” (Shearer, 2002, p. 555).   
To nail down their pragmatic self-interest 
further, accounting firms are issuing Bannerman-
inspired disclaimers with their audits – a practice that 
as some firms are realising might have the self-
defeating result of undermining the worth of the audit 
(ACCA, 2008). In this way, economic theory invites 
the imperialism of self-interest into every aspect of 
human behaviour as natural and self evident.  The 
result is that, within economic discourse, each 
individual is properly held accountable only for the 
pursuit of her or his private good (Shearer, 2002, 
p.555).  Thus, legal judgements (Caparo Industries v 
Dickman and Touche Ross & Co, 1990, and Royal 
Bank of Scotland v Bannerman Johnstone Maclay, 
2005) based on this discourse have found that third 
parties (who do not pay directly for the audit service) 
cannot hold auditors accountable.  However, as 
financial reports are held to be true and fair as a 
consequence of an unqualified audit, it seems odd that 
they are deemed only true and fair to those who can 
pay for them.   These judgements represent as a 
consequence a shift in legitimacy to pragmatic 
considerations being paramount and give the green 
light to audit firms who seek to narrow their 
responsibilities as in the Hanover Finance case.  
Unfortunately for the auditors and the controlling 
shareholders, the wider public had not appreciated this 
shift in legitimising accounting as a more pragmatic 
calculation.  The media attention that the Hanover 
Finance case engendered was huge, with television 
cameras camped outside the homes of the controlling 
shareholders to seek interviews which were not 
forthcoming as both main shareholders fled the 
country.  One of the controlling shareholders was 
even pursued by the media to his new home in 
Hawaii.  As has been cited, the only defence offered 
by one of the directors is that they had a clean audit, 
so what was the problem?  However, the New 
Zealand media interest in the Hanover Finance case 
that was aroused can be explained because the public 
has not understood that audits are tailored to meet the 
expectations of their fee-paying clients.  The image 
that accounting firms have cultivated is at odds with a 
legitimacy driven by more self-interested calculations.  
This was not the kind of legitimacy the New Zealand 
public expected it was granting to accounting firms.  
An expectation gap had emerged.  The old unwritten 
social contract gave legitimacy that featured more 
cognitive and moral drivers though there was always 
present a pragmatic driver.  Now it has emerged that, 
with or without disclaimers, some auditors are selling 
a “true and fair view”, which may not be a “true and 
fair view” for other stakeholders. In other words, self 
interest prevails and those that can pay receive what 
they pay for, those that do not or cannot pay for the 
service cannot expect to be catered for.  This is how 
the invisible hand of Adam Smith works: people 
supply what people are willing to pay for.  It is not the 
invisible hand of God but that of Social Darwinism.   
It was these principles from another age that the 
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earliest COE drew on. The current COE has a 
legitimising and reassuring role for its members and 
the public, but the source of such legitimisation has 
assumed more of a pragmatic, consequentialist 
direction and is part utilitarian and part Social 
Darwinist and less deontological. However, this 
analysis is limited by the extent that legitimacy is a 
motivating element for profession and their COE.  
Also, the analysis is based on the assumption that 
COE are derived from certain philosophical ethical 
theories and such COE may be drawn up without any 
prior thought as to underlying philosophical positions. 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
A longer, more detailed COE does not appear to have 
any effect on moral trends in accounting. Globally, 
there is evidence of a spread in self-interested 
“egoism” capitalism (The Economist, 2009), which 
may be a reflection of concepts drawn from social 
Darwinism. The cause of these shifts in the COE has 
been shown by Sikka et al (1989, 2000) and 
Baskerville-Morley (2004) to result from crisis 
situations and a subsequent asymmetry of 
stakeholders which allows some dominant 
stakeholders to become definitive.  The effects have 
been, as argued in this paper, to narrow the sphere of 
public responsibility and promote self-interest.  
Although the current COEs aim to sustain public 
reputation of the profession, in reality the codes 
appear to legitimate the profession at a pragmatic 
level.    The Hanover Finance case was cited as New 
Zealand’s contribution to this trend as this typical case 
explains why there has been widespread failure of 
most of New Zealand's finance companies. Audits 
were performed, but because of insufficient 
regulation, the same dubious accounting practices 
were condoned by the auditors who would seem to 
have interpreted their duty of care narrowly to serve 
their actual paymasters. Such end results undermine 
the advertising of the profession to convey an image 
of disinterested integrity and possibly have a 
consequence of calling for even more image 
advertising.  By contrast, the original COE was 
carefully restrictive and reduced advertising to a small 
card. 
The current COE would have us believe 
accounting can serve the public interest by being 
utilitarian – meaning objective and without bias, and 
serving both sides of any social conflict. While, in 
theory, everyone’s happiness is equally important, in 
practice, as some commentators have pointed out, 
such egalitarianism is inevitably denied. A calculation 
has to be performed by either appointed or 
unappointed moral legislators as to whose happiness 
constitutes the greatest happiness.  Unhappily, such 
legislators may prefer their own happiness, or that of 
their paymasters, and bias the calculation. Arguably, 
utilitarianism in its ideal sense is the better ethical 
position for the profession to pursue. However, ethical 
preferences are contentious and discussion can serve 
to illuminate differences in practice.  The point being 
that as "The Rot Spreads" (The Economist, 2009, p. 3) 
a focus on ethical issues in Accounting are 
worthwhile. Since the 1927 publication of the first 
New Zealand COE, the world has changed and other 
ideas now prevail. This is not to argue that before 
1927 some ideal sense of duty and virtue existed.  The 
celebrated Graham case illustrates that before Graham 
emptied the Fidelity Fund, such a fund existed to 
reimburse third parties who were the victims of 
predatory accountantsThe Hanover Finance case in 
New Zealand illustrates how the self-interest driver of 
legitimacy is predominant.  Arguably, such 
pragmatism is reflective of unconsciously absorbed 
Social Darwinist thinking which has an effect on 
institutions and accounting practices globally. For 
accountants such egoistical thinking, albeit often 
unconsciously absorbed, is a licence for practices that 
are directed to legitimising narrowly-served interests 
that, while possibly passing as legal, externalise an 
ethical cost to the wider public.   
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